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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-3908 
______________ 
 
SHEILA A. WOOD, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN WILLIAMS, Individually and in his capacity as executive director of the Bethlehem 
Area Vocational-Technical School; DR. IRENE GAVIN, Individually and in her capacity as 
Supervisor of Instruction-Principal of the Bethlehem Area Vocational-Technical School; 
SANDRA KLEIN, Individually and in her capacity as Supervisor of Lifelong Learning-
Technology of the Bethlehem Area Vocational-Technical School; JOHN HANEY, Individually 
and in his capacity as Technology Coordinator of the Bethlehem Area Vocational-Technical 
School; SHARON STACK, Individually and in her capacity as Chairperson of the Joint 
Operating Committee of the Bethlehem Area Vocational-Technical School; BETHLEHEM 
AREA VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL SCHOOL; BETHLEHEM AREA VOCATIONAL 
TECHNICAL SCHOOL AUTHORITY; BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
NORTHAMPTON AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; SAUCON VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
JOHN JANE DOES 1-X 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 5:12-cv-04624) 
District Judge: Hon. Stewart Dalzell 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 28, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.* 
 
                                                 
* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern 
District of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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(Opinion Filed: June 4, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
ROSENTHAL, District Judge. 
 
  
Plaintiff-Appellant Sheila A. Wood sued her former employer, the Bethlehem 
Area Vocational-Technical School (“BAVTS”), alleging that her work conditions were 
changed and that she was suspended without pay, then fired, in retaliation for speaking 
out on a matter of public concern.  Wood asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
First and Fourteenth Amendment violations and under state tort law for wrongful 
termination and related wrongs.  Wood also sued the three school districts that the 
BAVTS served and the Joint Operating Committee that managed the BAVTS, as well as 
the BAVTS executive director, the chair of the BAVTS Joint Operating Committee, and 
other BAVTS employees.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed Wood’s complaint in part, with prejudice, retaining some of the 
claims against two of the individual defendants.  The parties stipulated to dismiss the 
remaining claims to permit immediate appeal.  Wood appeals only the dismissal of the 
Monell claim against the BAVTS, the dismissal of the supervisory-liability claim against 
three of the individual defendants, and the dismissal of the § 1983 conspiracy claim 
against all individual defendants.  We find no basis for reversal and will affirm. 
I. 
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The BAVTS is a public educational institution serving students in the Bethlehem, 
Northampton, and Saucon Valley School Districts.  In October 2006, the BAVTS hired 
Wood as a technology assistant.  Wood alleged in her complaint that in 2010, she became 
concerned with asbestos exposure on the BAVTS campus and in a BAVTS project home.  
She alleged that the asbestos exposure was a matter of public concern that attracted local 
news-media attention.   
According to Wood, the Joint Operating Committee that managed the BAVTS’s 
day-to-day operations was responsible for “protecting the legal and Constitutional rights 
of individuals, including employees of BAVTS, within their respective legal 
jurisdictions, including . . . providing pre-employment screening, training, and 
supervision in a manner which is not deliberately indifferent to those said rights.”  
Compl. ¶¶ 8, 16.  The BAVTS Joint Operating Committee held open meetings at which 
members of the public could speak about various issues.  Wood spoke at these meetings 
about asbestos exposure at the BAVTS campus and in the project home.  Wood also 
talked to the BAVTS staff and others to “effectuate a response to the concerns raised by 
the asbestos exposure.”  Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. 
Wood alleged that after she spoke out at “numerous” Joint Operating Committee 
meetings, the BAVTS initiated disciplinary action against her, the first she had received 
in her employment there.  She was suspended without pay from February 17 to March 2, 
2010.  Wood alleged that when she returned to work after the suspension, her job duties 
were significantly altered: her access to equipment was restricted; she was assigned 
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inferior equipment; and she was denied access to a master key that she needed to do her 
job.  Wood believed that she was being “set up to fail.”  Id.   
 In June 2010, Wood received an unsatisfactory performance evaluation.  In July 
2010, the BAVTS sent Wood notice of a Loudermill hearing.  According to Wood, the 
Loudermill hearing was a sham.  She alleged that she did not get documents supporting 
the charges against her; the BAVTS administrators involved in the hearing, Brian 
Williams, the BAVTS Executive Director, and Sandra Klein, the “Supervisor of Lifelong 
Learning–Technology,” could not articulate a “single instance” of her misconduct; and 
she did not get fair notice of the reasons for her suspension.  Id.  
 On August 16, 2010, Wood was again suspended without pay.  Her employment 
was terminated on November 4, 2010, after the BAVTS Joint Operating Committee met.  
The Committee informed Wood that it acted because she had violated the BAVTS 
internet-use policy and her job performance was poor.  Wood alleged that these reasons 
were pretextual and that she was disciplined, then fired, because she had raised concerns 
about asbestos on the BAVTS property.  She alleged that the actions against her were in 
retaliation for her constitutionally protected speech.  Wood alleged that the actions were 
approved by “the Defendant’s high level officials and were carried out pursuant to 
custom and policy established with the Defendant’s internal rules,” id. ¶ 40, and that the 
individual defendants acted “pursuant to official policy or custom of one or more of the 
Institutional Defendants and with actual and or apparent authority of the said Defendants, 
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in an overt and direct attempt to punish [Wood] for exercising her Constitutional rights,” 
id. ¶ 41.   
Wood’s complaint asserted five counts under § 1983: that all defendants violated 
her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; that the individual defendants failed to 
intervene; supervisory liability as to four of the named individual defendants and the 
“Doe” defendants; Monell liability as to the institutional defendants; and that the 
individual defendants conspired to violate her rights.  The remaining three counts 
asserted state-law claims for wrongful termination against the institutional defendants; 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants; and conspiracy against 
all the defendants. 
The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
The District Court granted the motion in part, with prejudice, and denied it in part.  The 
parties stipulated to the District Court dismissing the remaining claims so that Wood 
could appeal the dismissal of the Monell claim against the BAVTS; the dismissal of the 
supervisory-liability claim against three of the individual defendants; and the dismissal of 
the conspiracy claim against all defendants.  We address these claims. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review over 
dismissals for failure to state a claim.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
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relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
III. 
Although Wood asserted a Monell claim against all five institutional defendants, 
she “does not appeal the dismissal of the School Districts which comprise the BAVTS, 
nor the dismissal of the BAVTS Authority.”  Blue Br. at 6.  Wood appeals only the 
District Court’s dismissal of the Monell claim against the BAVTS.   
Wood alleged that the BAVTS “developed and maintained policies or customs 
exhibiting deliberate indifference to the Constitutional rights of BAVTS employees, 
which caused the violation of” Wood’s constitutional rights.  Compl. ¶ 61.  She alleged 
that the BAVTS had a “policy and/or custom . . . to inadequately screen during the hiring 
process and to inadequately train, retrain and/or supervise BAVTS employees . . . thereby 
failing to adequately discourage Constitutional violations on the part of BAVTS 
employees.”  Id. ¶ 62.  Wood also alleged that the BAVTS “did not require or demand 
appropriate in-service training of BAVTS employees, who were known to encourage or 
tolerate Constitutional violations” and failed to adopt policies to prevent its supervisory 
employees from violating the constitutional rights of those they supervised.  Id. ¶¶ 63–64.  
“As a result of the above described policies and customs and/or failure to adopt necessary 
and appropriate policies, some BAVTS employees . . . believed that their actions would 
not be properly monitored by supervisory officials, and the Constitutional violations of 
the rights of individuals such as . . . Wood would not be investigated or sanctioned, but, 
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rather, would be tolerated.”  Id. ¶ 65.  “The above described policies and customs, and the 
failure to adopt necessary and appropriate policies, demonstrated a deliberate indifference 
on the part of the policymakers . . . and were the cause of the violation of [Wood’s] rights 
as alleged herein.”  Id. ¶ 66. 
 The BAVTS moved to dismiss the Monell claim on the basis that Wood had not 
“alleged that any state actor took any action pursuant to policy, practice, or custom to 
deny Wood a constitutional right. . . . [T]here [was] no allegation that any specific policy-
maker took action to deprive Wood of any right.”  App. 98.  The BAVTS noted that 
although Wood alleged that “high level officials” approved the actions against her and 
that they “were carried out pursuant to custom and policy,” she had failed to allege any 
facts showing that “any relevant policy-maker was implementing an official policy or 
practice.”  App. 100.   
In response, citing cases decided before Twombly and Iqbal, Wood argued that she 
could plead a Monell claim without alleging any facts showing what the official policy or 
custom was or identifying the policymaker or decisionmaker.  She argued that it was 
enough for her “to demonstrate circumstances from which a reasonable person could 
impute constructive knowledge” of unconstitutional actions to a policymaker or 
decisionmaker. She also argued that discovery was “necessary to determine the 
policymaking status of the individuals involved in the Constitutional violations.”  App. 
206. 
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The District Court dismissed Wood’s Monell claim because her complaint failed 
to identify any unlawful policy or custom and failed to identify any policymaker or 
decisionmaker responsible for the unlawful conduct alleged.  Instead, the complaint made 
conclusory and general claims of failure to screen, train, or supervise employees to avoid 
constitutional violations.  See Wood v. Bethlehem Area Vocational Technical Sch., No. 
12-cv-4624, 2013 WL 2983672, at *9–10 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2013) (citing McTernan v. 
City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009)).  The District Court was correct in finding 
that Wood’s complaint allegations stated the elements of the cause of action and were 
insufficient.  Id.  “[S]imply paraphras[ing] § 1983” does not meet Rule 8’s pleading 
requirements because it fails to satisfy the “rigorous standards of culpability and 
causation” required to state a claim for municipal liability.  McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658–
59 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)); see 
also Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 135 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Wood argues on appeal that the District Court’s dismissal of the Monell claim 
against the BAVTS “overlooks the crucial fact that the [unlawful] decision of” Williams 
and Klein “was ratified by the governing body of BAVTS, known as the ‘Joint Operating 
Committee.’”  Blue Br. at 14.  Sharon Stack signed the decision to fire Wood on the Joint 
Operating Committee’s behalf.  Wood argues that the “lower court [was] simply 
incorrect” in dismissing the Monell claim because by alleging ratification by the BAVTS 
Joint Operating Committee, she adequately alleged both what the unconstitutional custom 
consisted of and who the decisionmakers were.  Blue Br. at 14–15.  But the complaint 
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Wood filed in the District Court did not allege a ratification theory of Monell liability, 
and the briefs she filed with the District Court did not present this ratification argument. 
Wood’s complaint alleged that the BAVTS violated her First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights because it had a custom of failing to screen when it hired employees 
and of failing to train and supervise them to avoid violating the constitutional rights of 
those they supervised.  The complaint did not allege any of the elements necessary to 
plead a valid failure-to-screen claim, including a link between the failure to screen at 
hiring and the constitutional injury alleged.  See Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 410–11 (“To 
prevent municipal liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into respondeat superior 
liability, a court must [be able to] carefully test the link between the policymaker’s 
inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged. . . .  [The plaintiff must demonstrate 
that] scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to 
conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would 
be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right.”).   
The complaint was also deficient in alleging a claim for failure to train or 
supervise.  The complaint did not allege facts showing any particular or specific policy or 
custom, or how it allowed the claimed constitutional violation to occur, identifying the 
policymaker or decisionmaker, or showing prior notice through a pattern of similar 
constitutional violations.  See, e.g., McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658; see also Thomas v. 
Cumberland Cnty., — F.3d —, —, 2014 WL 1395666, at *7 (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2014) 
(“Liability cannot rest only on a showing that the employees could have been better 
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trained or that additional training was available that would have reduced the overall risk 
of constitutional injury.  [T]he causation inquiry focuses on whether the injury [could] 
have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient 
in the identified respect.” (quotations omitted)).   
Failure to train can be the basis of Monell liability when the municipality’s 
“failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.”  City of Canton v. 
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 392 (1989); see Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 
215 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a failure-to-train claim must reflect a deliberate or 
conscious choice by a municipality as defined in Supreme Court cases); Carter v. City of 
Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[I]n order for a municipality’s failure to train 
or supervise to amount to deliberate indifference, it must be shown that (1) municipal 
policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation 
involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong 
choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” 
(citations and footnote omitted)).  
In addition, the complaint did not allege any facts that could support an inference 
that the BAVTS was on notice of the risk of retaliation for First Amendment protected 
speech by employees, and that it was deliberately indifferent to this risk.  While the 
complaint briefly mentioned one of Wood’s coworkers, a man named Crosby, as one who 
spoke out at a meeting and was later suspended, “[p]roof of a single incident of 
unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of 
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the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional 
[government] policy, which policy can be attributed to a . . . policymaker.”  City of Okla. 
City v.Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985).   
When the defendants pointed to the complaint’s deficiencies in the motion to 
dismiss, Wood did not respond with the ratification theory of liability that she asserts 
here.  Instead, Wood argued to the District Court that she needed discovery to determine 
the policymaking status of those who had committed the constitutional violations.  She 
stated that discovery was “necessary to determine the policymaking status of the 
individuals involved in the Constitutional violations.”  App. 206.  But Wood did not 
explain why her own knowledge about the BAVTS from her years of working there did 
not allow her to plead with more factual specificity.   
Wood had not alleged in the complaint, and she did not argue in her brief opposing 
the motion to dismiss, that the BAVTS was liable under § 1983 because the Joint 
Operating Committee ratified the unconstitutional behavior of subordinate BAVTS 
employees.  The District Court did not “simply overlook[]” these arguments; they were 
not presented.  “We generally refuse to consider issues that are raised for the first time on 
appeal.”  Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976).   
Finally, even if the complaint had alleged a ratification basis for Monell liability 
consistent with the argument Wood raises for the first time on appeal, the allegations 
would have been deficient.  Wood’s ratification theory might fill in one of the pleading 
deficiencies the District Court identified, the failure to identify a policymaker or 
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decisionmaker.  Wood’s ratification theory does not fill in the second deficiency, the 
failure to plead any facts showing what the unlawful policy or custom was.  McTernan, 
564 F.3d at 658.  And even assuming that the Joint Committee was the relevant 
decisionmaker, Wood’s complaint still does not allege facts required to plead Monell 
liability for failing to hire, train, or screen.    
We will affirm the dismissal of the Monell claim against the BAVTS.   
IV. 
 The District Court dismissed the supervisory-liability claims asserted against the 
individual defendants and dismissed the other claims against these defendants except 
Williams and Klein.  Wood, 2013 WL 2983672, at *11.  Wood argues that the District 
Court erred in dismissing the supervisory-liability claims against Williams, Klein, and 
Dr. Irene Gavin.  Wood, however, presents an argument only as to Williams and Klein. 
Wood’s complaint alleged that “[o]ne or more of the Defendants acted in a 
supervisory capacity under circumstances, and at a time, when one or more of the 
subordinate Defendants violated the Plaintiff’s rights as set forth herein.”  Compl. ¶ 57.  
“In that regard, the Supervisory Defendants, now known and unknown, either directed 
the conduct which resulted in the violation of the Plaintiffs’ federal rights as alleged; or, 
had actual knowledge of the subordinates violation of Plaintiffs’ rights and acquiesced in 
said violations; or, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and 
maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the violation or, had a 
policy of maintaining no policy, where one or more policies or regulations were clearly 
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needed.”  Id.  The District Court noted that the body of the complaint mentioned only two 
of the individual defendants by name—Brian Williams, the Executive Director of 
BAVTS, and Sandra Klein, “Supervisor of Lifelong Learning – Technology.”  Wood, 
2013 WL 2983672, at *2.  Wood alleged that “none of the administrators present 
including [Klein and Williams] could articulate one single instance of misconduct” at her 
Loudermill hearing.  Compl. ¶ 32.  The District Court denied the motion to dismiss these 
claims against Williams and Klein but granted the motion to dismiss the supervisory-
liability claims against them and granted the motion to dismiss all claims as to the other 
individual defendants.  The court explained: 
[i]f, as the complaint alleges, the hearing was insufficient to protect Wood’s 
due process rights, and if it was used as a vehicle for her firing in retaliation 
for protected First Amendment activity, then Klein and Williams would 
have participated in a deprivation of Wood’s constitutional rights. 
  
Wood, 2013 WL 2983672, at *6.  In dismissing the claims against Sharon Stack, chair of 
the Joint Operating Committee, the District Court noted that the complaint failed “to 
allege any facts whatsoever with respect to” this defendant.  Id.   
We will affirm for the reasons stated by the District Court.  The complaint 
contained no specific factual allegations fleshing out the claims of supervisory liability.  
Id. at *11.  By contrast, the complaint specifically alleged that Williams and Klein were 
involved in providing a deficient Loudermill hearing, and the District Court retained 
these claims.   
Citing excerpts from the termination hearing, not the complaint, Wood argues on 
appeal that Williams and Klein had supervisory authority over her at the BAVTS and 
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were personally involved in deciding to terminate her employment.  These allegations 
were not in the complaint before the District Court.  Given the complaint allegations and 
the arguments Wood made to the District Court, it was not inconsistent for that court to 
dismiss the supervisory liability claims against Williams and Klein for factually 
insufficient pleading and to deny the motion to dismiss against them for individually 
violating her constitutional rights by providing a deficient Loudermill hearing.   
Finally, we will affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 conspiracy claims for the 
reasons the District Court stated.  Id.  The complaint contained no specific factual 
allegations of “combination, agreement, or understanding among all or between any of 
the defendants to plot, plan or conspire to carry out the challenged conduct.”  Id. (citing 
D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d 
Cir. 1992)).  
V. 
Wood’s arguments on appeal show no basis for reversal.  The District Court’s 
judgment will be affirmed. 
